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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plain tiff-Respondent,
Case No.
11580

-v-

(DAVID DOUGLAS HOOPER) and SOUTH
SLATERVILLE WATER COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant. J

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent commenced a condemnation action
against appellant to acquire .25 acres of land which
constituted a part of an irrigation facility owned and
operated by appellant in Weber County, Utah.
DISPOSITION OF CASE
The matter was tried before the Honorable
Charles G. Cowley, sitting without .:i. jury, on the
18th and 19th days of December, 1968. The trial court
awarded appellant the amount of $450.00 as the value
of the .25 acres actually taken. The trial court further
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found that no compensable item of severance damuge existed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully submits that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant owns and operates an irrigation canal
system in Weber County, Utah. In the specific area
wherein the .25 acres of land was appropriated by
respondent, the canal runs in an easterly-westerly
direction and the highway improvement dissects the
canal at right angles in a northerly-southerly direction. (Ex. A2) The highway facility is part of the interstate project and is identified as Project No. 1-15-8
(7) 338. As it relates to appellant's property, a large
overpass structure was constructed spanning both
the canal of appellant and the Southern Pacific Railroad right-of-way which is located directly north and
parallel to appellant's property. (Ex. A2)
The trial court awarded appellant the amount
of $450.00 for the land actually appropriated. This
award was pursuant to a stipulation of the parties
lhat the land value was $1,800.00 per acre. (T. 55)
The take consisted of an area 332 feet in width
and 36 feet in depth. A 12 foot maintenance road
abutting the south boundary of the cdnal remained
but for a length of 270 feet directly below the overpass structure. In this area, the maintenance road
was reduced to a width of 4Vz feet. (Ex. A2) There
is no dispute between the parties as to the existence
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3
of this 4 V2 foot access to the banks of the canal immediately below the structure. (T. 36) Appellant recognizes the availability of the remaining 4V2 foot
access but complains that such access does not permit the utilization of mechanized equipment in the
area directly beneath the structure.
The Willard Canal runs in a northerly-southerly
direction parallel to appellant's canal and is located
approximately 300 feet east of the interstate highway
right-of-way line. Appellant's point of diversion is
located on the Willard Canal. (Ex. 2)
Appellant, in the statement of facts set forth in
its brief, recites conclusive statements with respec
to its inability to gain access to its maintenance road
from the Willard Canal and also the method of construction utilized by respondent. However, these
statements are properly elements of argument and
will be treated as such by respondent.
It may be noted, however, that the trial court
sp.:;cjficdly found that appellant has full access to
the banks of its canal at every point and has
sustained no severance damage to its remaining
property. (R. 13, 14)
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO AWARD APPELLANT SEVERANCE DAMAGES.

Appellant does not challenge the basic proposition that the judgment of a trial court will not be
disturbed on appeal if there is evidence to support
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such a judgment. Therefore, the only consideration
presented to this court is whether the record supports a conclusion that severance damage does not
exist.
The evidence submitted by appellant to justify
its claim of severance damage was u.ll related to the
increased costs to be anticip:i.ted in the future maintenance of the canal system in the area of the highway facility. The question of access to the banks of
the canal was not seriously questioned in tha.t appellant continues to enjoy full-length access even
under the overpass structure. As noted above, appellant's complaint is predicated on the fact that
mechanized equipment may not be operated under
the structure and that a circuitous route must be
pursued to allow mechanized equipment access to
the canal area east o.l the s[ructure.
The court specifically found that appellant enjoys a perpetual eassment within the i:!.1terstate rightof-way for the purpose of maintaining its canal.
Therefore, appellant does net trespass on State
owned property in performi.ng maintenance duties
and has the physical ability to approach and maintain the canal.

In State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission -vStanger, 21 Utah 2d 185, 442 P.2d 941 (1968), this court
stated at 21 Utah 2d 186:

* * * that severance damages were those suffered by a devaluation of the owner's property
not taken, the causa causa causans of which
was the actual taking of a part of a unit of
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5
property, the whole of which he previously
owned.

To constitute severance damage as against noncornpensCJ.ble consequential damage, the loss must
be the diminishment in valuG to the remaining property by virtue 0£ the loss r:if that uppropriated and
vvhich is the direct result of the appropriatlon. As
st31.ed by this court in State of Utah, by and through its
Road Commission -Ii- \Villiams, 22 Utah 2d 331, 452 P. 2d
881 (1969) :i.t 22 Utah 2d 332, 333:
All d".lr:iages not cc.used by the taking or the
sevetin:-:- of the k~;.d nr ~he manner of the construction of the im;)rovci-ent axe consequential
and not within the protec~ion of the constitutional p;:ovision (Article 1, 82ction 22, of the
TJtd"! Cons•it,itio:i) unless they are such as
wf'u!d be :;c~ion'.lb1e 3.t co:-:1mon law or would
::iffe('.t the l.md physic"llly. :, ':' *

The elements of that which appellant urges as
severance damages are not .such a causally connected diminishment of market value. This was recognized by this court in Stat(' P.oad Com minion -i·- Utah Sugar
Company, 22 Utah 2d 77, 448 P. 2d 901 (1968). In a factual situation identical to that presented by the instant case, this court concluded that additional costs
required by extra mileage and wages of inspectors
or canal riders incurred through the imposition of a
circuitous route could not be considered severance
damage. This court stated at 22 Utah 2d 79:
Our own aCJthoritics clf'J.rly, or by analogy,
subsUmtia~e the basic ru'.e set out in Nichols,
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supra, and th2 concept th:1t •o justify ''2ver·rnce
d2.mages, the dama~e must be done to the land
its21.r,--not to that on top of the land which is
not a part of the realty, or what is done on top
of the land, such as patrolling canals, as is the
case here.

Respondent submits that the above case is controlling c.nd is dispositive of the instant case.
Appellant a.ttempts to distinguish the Utah Sugar
Company case on severnl grounds. First, a_ppsllant
contends that the Utah Sugar Company case dealt
with the improvement of an existing facility vvhile
the instant case involves the esablishment of a newly loco_ted facility. However, this argument ignores
the basic fa.ct that the improvement and resultant
control of access present jn the Utah Sugar Com~-:i3-n'r case produced exactly the same result with
r2spect to can.3_1 maintenance problems as is found
in the instant cas0. It was the result that such inl'rs:-ised m"J.intenance costs 'Nere not compensable.
Th_:o;_; result should be eque>Jly applied Jn this mo.tter.
Second, appellant sta~es at page 6 of its brief
thot in the Utah Sugar Company case, the canal company had access to the banks of its canal at all
points. However, this argument is incorrect for the
reason that, in the Utah Sugar Company case, access adjacent to the canal under the overpass structure was not present. This court recognized at 22
Utah 2d 79:
':' ':' * it had access not only by this method but
so A.t the side of the freeway, on both sides

:: 1
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thereof and under the f rr:eway itself ,-the latter
by boat, wadding, if the water were not too deep,
or by other means. * * '; (Emphasis added)

Appellant's attempts to factually distinguish the
Utah Sugar Company case from the instant proceedings fail bocause of a basic ministerpretat'on of the
facts of the cited case and :ilso because of the existence of the 4 Y2 foot area under the structure present
in the instant case. Respondent submits that a careful consideration of the facts and legal doctrines set
forth in the Utah Sugar Company case lead to the
single conclusion that appellant's claim for severance damage on the basis therefore must fail
Appellant submits further that the access to the
area adjacent to the canal east of the freeway is im9aired because of the inability of appellant to bring
motorized equipment off of the Willard Canal. The
evidence with respect to this contention is somewhat
confusing and not supported by the record as a
whole. For example, Mr. Julian Powell, a director
and secretary-treasurer of appellant, testified as follc_jws:
Q

You can still come off 12th North and cross
the railroad tracks down to where the
freeway is with the same full right you had
before; can you not?

A

That's right.

Q

And the only problem with getting access
to the banks of the canal east of the freeway is this circuitous route which you
must now travel; is this correct?
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A.

That's the only way we have of getting
to the eastern part.

Q

But once you follow that route you do have
access to the canal bank itself; do you not?

A

We do until we get to the freeway, yes.
(T. 53)

* * *
Mr. Wilbur Cook, who testified as appellant's
expert appraiser, also stated that a cul-de-sac area
immediately adjacent to the structure on both the
east and west side of the structure to permit the
turning around of mechanized equipment would
eliminate on element of severance damage. In lvfr.
Cook's opinion, the only remaining severance damage would be the increased maintenance cost by
virtue of the circuity of travel. (T. 63)
Because of this testimnoy by Mr. Cook, respondent, through trial counsel, tendered to appellant a reasonable area to allow the turning around
of mechanized equipment on both the east and west
side of the structure. This, of course, would eliminate
the technical trespass occurring during the turning
around operation. In accepting this tender, counsel
for appellant stated:

* * *
"MR. RICHARDS: Yes. This canal bank is
up some eight feet higher than the road, so if
we'd either had some money to make that so
it would be easy to go up and down there, or
if the State did it, made a nice ramp down
there, why then we could get in to everywhere
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except under here. (indicating under structure)
This would have to be manually cleaned, but
then they could drive into there by driving
around to do it."
(T. 65)

* * *
Respondent recognizes that statements of counsel are not to be considered as evidence. However,
this acceptance of the cul-de-sac offer reflects the
inconsistent position assumed by appellant after
being encountered by the Utah Sugar Company
case, supra, and lends support to the trial court's
finding that full access of even motorlzed equipment is available to appellant by merely pursuing
the circuitous route.
In further support of the trial court's findings,
respondent directs this court's attention to the testimony of Mr. Memory Cain, an expert fee appraiser
who testified on behalf of respondent. Mr. Cain
testified that his investigation revealed an ability on
the part of appellant to transpor mechanized equipmen down the Willard Canal to its maintenance
road. Mr .Cain's investigation was further substantiated by the existence of a 16 foot gate in the fence
separating the properties of appellant and the
W i 11 a rd Canal. This gate indicates a willingness on the part of the Willard Canal owners to
allow appellant access to its maintenance road of
not only personnel but also equipment. (T. 161)
Appellant devotes a good portion of its brief
to criticism of the manner of construction of the overpass structure employed by respondent. However,
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respondent submits that this appeal is not the proper
procedural arena in which to contest 3uch an issue.
An order of immediate occupancy was obtained
by respondent on the 10th day of January, 1966. In
the interim between the granting of the order and
the trial, appellant failed to pursue any type of injunctive relief that may have been predicated on a
claim of arbitrary and capricious action.
A further inconsistency exists in appellant's
value approach. A cost-of-cure figure was submitted
on the basis of an adoption of one of two alternative proposals submitted by a witness for appellant.
This evidence was submitted to allo·N the court to
consider the damages sustamed by appellant by
virtue of the manner of construction. However, the
court properly recognized that the cost-of-cure approach was directed at a noncompensable element
of damage and refused to adopt such an approach.
The elimination of the circuitry of travel was not
compensable and the cost-of-cure directed at
eliminating such an element is also noncompensable.
Respondent recognizes that under 78-34-i 0 (2)
Utah Code Annotated (as amended 1969), certain
damages resulting from the manner of construction
proposed by a condemnor are to be allowed. However, in the instant case the damages resulting from
the construction of the improvement are noncompensable by their very nature.
It is respectfully submitted that evidence of alternative methods of construction is not evidence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

of arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the
respondent. By virtue of the Constitution of the State
of Utah and the statutes pertaining thereto, respondent stands ready and able to compensate a land
owner for certain damages accruing by virtue of the
construction. This is limited only by the consideration that such damages must be compensable under
the constitution and statutes relating thereto. In the
instant case, it is obvious that such compensable
damages do not exist.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the judgment of the
trial court is amply supported by the record and
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

GARY A. FRANK
Special Assistant Attorney
General
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